# ISDA Section 5 Events of Default & Cross-Default Thresholds

> Master 2002 ISDA Section 5(a) Events of Default vs Section 5(b) Termination Events: 1-day payment grace, Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default, and Thresholds.

Canonical: https://finlexicon.org/wiki/isda-section-5-events-of-default-cross-default-threshold-amount
Last updated: 2026-11-14T19:37:47.292Z

**Publication:** FinLexicon Wiki
**Category:** Isda Csa Derivatives Collateral
**Published:** 2026-11-14T00:25:25.915Z
**Author:** Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD (CPA, JD in International Banking & Basel Regulation)
**Reviewer:** Not recorded

## Answer-first summary

Section 5 of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement separates fault-based Events of Default (with shortened 1-day payment grace periods and Cross-Default Threshold Amounts) from no-fault Illegality, Force Majeure, and Tax Termination Events.

## Key takeaways

- The 2002 ISDA Master Agreement tightened Section 5(a)(i) Failure to Pay grace periods from 3 days to 1 Local Business Day and involuntary bankruptcy cure windows from 30 to 15 days.
- Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default aggregates both third-party borrowed-money defaults eligible for acceleration AND unpaid matured debt against the Schedule’s Threshold Amount.
- Commercial banks must always carve ordinary-course customer deposits out of "Specified Indebtedness" so contested deposit freezes never trigger global swap Cross-Default.
- Unlike Section 5(a) defaults (100% portfolio at replacement bid/offer), 2002 Section 5(b)(i)/(ii) Illegality and Force Majeure terminate only Affected Transactions at Mid-Market.

## Related financial entities

- **ISDA 2002 Master Agreement & Credit Support Annex (CSA) Close-Out Netting** (ISDA-2002-CSA) — license: ISDA 2002 Master Agreement & Credit Support Annex (CSA) Close-Out Netting (ISDA-2002-CSA) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by International Swaps and Derivatives Association (INTL), currently calibrated at 0.0% (Netted Exposure Haircut) as of October 2026.
- **ISDA 2002 Master Agreement & Credit Support Annex (CSA) Close-Out Netting — 2026 Standard** (ISDA-2002-CSA-STD) — license: ISDA-2002-CSA 2026 Institutional Benchmark Framework is defined as the standardized quantitative and compliance methodology published by International Swaps and Derivatives Association governing ISDA 2002 Master Agreement & Credit Support Annex (CSA) Close-Out Netting across INTL capital markets (0.0% Netted Exposure Haircut, October 2026).

## Analysis

Not every event that ends a derivatives contract carries fault, cross-acceleration contagion, or unilateral portfolio-wide liquidation rights. **Section 5 of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement** draws a razor-sharp architectural boundary between **eight fault-based Events of Default (`Section 5(a)`)**—which entitle the Non-Defaulting Party to terminate **100% of all outstanding transactions** at replacement side-of-market—and **six no-fault Termination Events (`Section 5(b)`)**, which typically terminate **only Affected Transactions** at **mid-market**.

## Key Upgrades From 1992 to 2002 Across the Eight Section 5(a) Events of Default

In institutional credit negotiations anchored to our [2002 ISDA Master Agreement cornerstone guide](/wiki/isda-2002-master-agreement-vm-im-csa-simm-netting-guide), risk officers focus immediately on how the **2002 ISDA** tightened cure windows relative to the **1992 ISDA**:

1. **Failure to Pay or Deliver (`Section 5(a)(i)`)**: Shortened the cure grace period after notice from **3 Local Business Days (1992)** down to **1 Local Business Day (2002)**—preventing a failing counterparty from free-riding across a long 5-day holiday weekend!
2. **Breach of Agreement / Repudiation (`Section 5(a)(ii)`)**: Retains a 30-day notice cure for non-payment covenant breaches, while making **repudiation or disaffirmation** an **instant (`0-day`)** Event of Default.
3. **Credit Support Default (`Section 5(a)(iii)`)**: Triggered if either party—or its Credit Support Provider (guarantor)—fails to transfer required [2016 Variation Margin or UMR Initial Margin](/wiki/isda-2016-vm-csa-ny-security-interest-vs-english-title-transfer) past the CSA’s 1-to-2-day cure gate!
4. **Default Under Specified Transaction (`Section 5(a)(v)`)**: Broadened in 2002 to capture repos, securities lending, forward rate agreements, and physically settled commodity/FX trades **between the two parties (and their Specified Entities)** with **zero dollar threshold**!
5. **Bankruptcy (`Section 5(a)(vii)`)**: Shortened the involuntary insolvency-petition dismissal grace period from **30 days (1992)** down to **15 calendar days (2002)**.

![Comparison flowchart routing ISDA breaches into Section 5(a) portfolio-wide default vs Section 5(b) affected-trade termination](/api/figure?type=flow&title=2002%20ISDA%20Section%205%28a%29%20vs%20Section%205%28b%29%20Termination%20Routing%20Engine&subtitle=Distinguishing%20fault-based%20portfolio%20liquidation%20%28bid%2Foffer%29%20from%20no-fault%20affected%20trades%20%28mid-market%29&steps=1.%20Trigger%20Classification%3A%3ASeparate%20Fault%20breach%2Finsolvency%20%28Sec%205%28a%29%29%20from%20External%2FStatus%20shock%20%28Sec%205%28b%29%29%7C2.%20Grace%20%2F%20Waiting%20Gate%3A%3A1%20LBD%20Payment%2C%2015d%20Invol.%20Bankruptcy%20%285a%29%20vs%203%20LBD%20Illegality%2C%208%20LBD%20Force%20Majeure%7C3.%20Scope%20of%20Trades%3A%3ASec%205%28a%29%20%2B%20Credit%20Merger%2FATE%20%3D%20100%25%20Portfolio%3B%20Illegality%2FFM%2FTax%20%3D%20Affected%20Only%7C4.%20Pricing%20Basis%3A%3ASec%205%28a%29%2F1-Affected%20%3D%20Replacement%20Bid%2FAsk%3B%20Illegality%2FFM%20%3D%20Mid-Market%20Close-Out!&metrics=2002%20Pay%20Grace%3A%3A1%20Bus.%20Day%3A%3ATightened%20from%203%20LBD%20%281992%29%7CInvol.%20Bankruptcy%3A%3A15%20Cal.%20Days%3A%3ATightened%20from%2030d%20%281992%29%7CFM%20Waiting%20Period%3A%3A8%20Bus.%20Days%3A%3AAdded%20in%202002%20Master%20Sec%205%28b%29%7CBank%20Cross-Default%3A%3A2%25%E2%80%933%25%20Equity%3A%3AExcludes%20Customer%20Deposits!)

## Negotiating Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default: Specified Indebtedness, Threshold Amount & Operational Carve-Outs

Why wait for Counterparty B to miss a quarterly swap coupon in November if Counterparty B defaulted on a `$250M` syndicated bank loan in September? **Section 5(a)(vi) ("Cross-Default")** acts as an early-warning tripwire on **third-party debt ("Specified Indebtedness"—defined as obligations in respect of borrowed money)** whenever cumulative defaulted/accelerated debt equals or exceeds the Schedule’s **Threshold Amount**!

Watch the four high-stakes negotiation levers at [Bank of America](/institutions/bofa), [BNP Paribas](/institutions/bnp-paribas), and [Bank of Montreal](/institutions/bmo):
- **Cross-Default vs Cross-Acceleration**: Buy-side funds and corporates sometimes push to narrow Cross-Default to **Cross-Acceleration** (triggering *only* after third-party bondholders actually accelerate principal, rather than when an unaccelerated payment/covenant default occurs).
- **Percentage vs Fixed Threshold Amount**: Dealers negotiate **2% to 3% of Shareholders’ Equity / Tier 1 Capital** for banks (capped or paired with e.g. `$100M–$250M`), and **2%–3% of Net Asset Value (NAV)** (with a `$10M–$25M` floor) for hedge/credit funds.
- **Bank Deposit Exclusion Carve-Out**: Commercial banks **MUST carve out "deposits received in the ordinary course of banking business"** from *Specified Indebtedness*—otherwise a local branch freezing `$150M` of disputed deposits under foreign sanctions or court attachment would accidentally trigger global ISDA Cross-Default!
- **Administrative / Operational Error Carve-Out**: Excludes 1-to-3-day technical wire delays where cash was demonstrably available in the account.

## Section 5(b) Termination Events: Force Majeure Waiting Periods & Mid-Market Two-Affected Pricing

Unlike Section 5(a) defaults, **Section 5(b) Termination Events**—*Illegality* (`5(b)(i)`), the **2002-introduced *Force Majeure Event* (`5(b)(ii)`)**, *Tax Event* (`5(b)(iii)`), *Tax Event Upon Merger* (`5(b)(iv)`), *Credit Event Upon Merger* (`5(b)(v)`), and negotiated [Additional Termination Events (ATEs)](/wiki/ate-additional-termination-events-nav-decline-rating-triggers) (`5(b)(vi)`)—handle external shocks:

- **Force Majeure Waiting Period (`8 Local Business Days` vs `3 LBD` Illegality)**: Under 2002 Section 5(b)(ii), if an act of state, war, or exchange closure makes payment/delivery impossible, obligations pause for an **8-Local-Business-Day Waiting Period** before either party may terminate **only the Affected Transactions**.
- **Mid-Market Close-Out Valuation (`Section 6(e)(ii)(3)`)**: For *Illegality* and *Force Majeure* (where both parties are innocent), [2002 Close-Out Amount](/wiki/isda-1992-market-quotation-loss-vs-2002-close-out-amount) is calculated at **Mid-Market** (excluding dealer bid-offer crossing spreads!).

| Clause & Event | 1992 ISDA Rule | 2002 ISDA Upgrade | Scope of Terminated Trades | Close-Out Valuation Side |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sec. 5(a)(i) Failure to Pay | 3 Local Business Days after notice | **1 Local Business Day** after notice | 100% of Master Agreement | Non-Defaulting side of Bid/Offer |
| Sec. 5(a)(v) Specified Transaction | Narrow OTC derivative list | Expanded to Repos, SFTs & Physicals ($0 TH) | 100% of Master Agreement | Non-Defaulting side of Bid/Offer |
| Sec. 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default | Borrowed money >= Threshold Amount | Aggregates default + un-paid maturity >= TH | 100% of Master Agreement | Non-Defaulting side of Bid/Offer |
| Sec. 5(a)(vii) Involuntary Bankruptcy | 30 calendar days to dismiss petition | **15 calendar days** to dismiss petition | 100% of Master Agreement | Non-Defaulting side of Bid/Offer |
| Sec. 5(b)(i)/(ii) Illegality & Force Majeure | Illegality only (no FM clause!) | 3 LBD Illegality / **8 LBD Force Majeure** | Affected Transactions ONLY | **Mid-Market** (no bid-ask penalty) |

## Regulatory Resolution Stays Override Bankruptcy & Cross-Default Triggers

Critical modern statutory override: if a G-SIB parent holding company enters resolution under [FSB TLAC, EU BRRD, or FDIC Orderly Liquidation](/wiki/close-out-netting-legal-opinions-stay-protocols-brrd-us-qfc), statutory **QFC Stay Rules** temporarily suspend (`24–48 hours`) and then permanently override Section 5(a)(vi)/(vii) cross-defaults on solvent operating subsidiaries provided guarantees transfer cleanly.

![Comparison of Cross-Default Threshold Amount calibration across G-SIBs, regional corporates, and hedge funds](/api/figure?type=bars&title=Typical%20Institutional%20Cross-Default%20Threshold%20Calibrations%20%28%24M%29&subtitle=Balancing%20hair-trigger%20operational%20noise%20against%20timely%20early-termination%20protection&steps=G-SIB%20Dealer%20%283%25%20Cap%29%3A%3A3%25%20of%20%2465B%20CET1%20%28%241.95B%29%20often%20capped%20bilaterally%20at%20%24250M%E2%80%93%24500M%20fixed%20ceiling%7CIG%20Corporate%20%28%24100M%29%3A%3A2%25%E2%80%933%25%20of%20shareholders%20equity%20or%20matched%20to%20Revolving%20Credit%20Agreement%20cross-default%7CMulti-Strat%20Fund%20%28%245B%29%3A%3A2%25%20of%20%245.0B%20NAV%20%3D%20%24100M%20%28paired%20with%20separate%2015%25%E2%80%9325%25%20Monthly%20NAV%20Decline%20ATE!%29%7CSpecified%20Trans.%20%285av%29%3A%3A%240.0M%20Threshold!%20Any%20uncured%20repo%20or%20FX%20default%20*between*%20the%20two%20parties%20triggers%20EoD&metrics=G-SIB%20Threshold%3A%3A2%25%E2%80%933%25%20Cap%3A%3AExcludes%20Ordinary%20Deposits%7CHedge%20Fund%20TH%3A%3A2%25%E2%80%933%25%20NAV%3A%3APlus%20Separate%20NAV%20ATE%7CSec%205%28a%29%28v%29%20TH%3A%3A%240.0M%20Zero%3A%3ADirect%20Repo%2FSFT%20Between%20Pair%7CTech%20Error%20Carve%3A%3A1%E2%80%933%20Bus.%20Days%3A%3AWhen%20Cash%20Proved%20Available)

## Cross-Checking Credit Triggers Across the ISDA & CSA Silo

Credit officers align Section 5(a)(vi) Threshold Amounts directly with Section 5(b)(v) Credit Event Upon Merger tests across the [ISDA-2002-CSA 2026 Benchmark Standard](/entity-index/isda-2002-csa-2026-benchmark-standard) and the [2002 ISDA Master Agreement, CSA & SIMM topic hub](/topics/isda-csa-derivatives-collateral).

```formula
Cross_Default_Triggered <=> ( Sum_m Accelerated_or_Accelerable_Debt_m + Sum_n Unpaid_Matured_Debt_n ) >= Threshold_Amount
Threshold_Amount_Dynamic = min( Hard_Dollar_Cap , alpha_Equity * Latest_Audited_Shareholders_Equity_or_NAV )

Worked Corporate Treasury Cross-Default Audit ($4.0B Shareholders Equity; Schedule Election = min($120M, 2.5% of Equity) = $100.0M):
 Event 1: Borrower misses covenant on $65M bilateral equipment loan (lender can accelerate) => $65M < $100M (No ISDA EoD yet)
 Event 2: Borrower fails to repay $45M commercial paper note at maturity (past grace period) => Cumulative = $65M + $45M = $110M!
 Result: $110.0M >= $100.0M Threshold Amount -> Triggers Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default across 100% of ISDA swap portfolio!
```

## Frequently asked questions

### Why does a hedge fund with zero bank loans still care deeply about Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default?

Wait—standard *Specified Indebtedness* covers "obligations in respect of borrowed money," which often excludes prime-brokerage repos and derivatives! That is precisely why dealers ask hedge funds to expand Specified Indebtedness in Part 1(c) of the Schedule to include prime-brokerage margin loans, repos, and third-party derivative close-outs above 2%–3% of NAV!

### What is the difference between Section 5(a)(v) Default Under Specified Transaction and Section 5(a)(vi) Cross-Default?

Section 5(a)(v) covers other derivatives, repos, and SFTs directly between Party A and Party B (and their Credit Support Providers/Specified Entities) with zero dollar threshold, whereas Section 5(a)(vi) covers borrowed-money defaults by Party B to unrelated third-party lenders subject to the Threshold Amount.

### Why did the 1998 Russian GKO debt moratorium inspire the 2002 Section 5(b)(ii) Force Majeure clause?

In August 1998, currency controls and settlement freezes were not technically "illegal" under every governing law—leaving 1992 ISDA counterparties without an Illegality exit while hitting 3-day Failure to Pay defaults! The 2002 Force Majeure clause provides a clean 8-business-day cooling-off window followed by mid-market close-out.

### When does Section 5(b)(v) "Credit Event Upon Merger" fire during a leveraged buyout (LBO)?

If a corporate swap counterparty merges, consolidates, or transfers substantially all assets—or undergoes a 2002 capital reorganization/LBO debt recapitalization—leaving the resulting entity "materially weaker" creditwise, Section 5(b)(v) lets the bank terminate all swaps with that counterparty!


## Source URLs

- https://www.isda.org/book/2002-isda-master-agreement-english/
- https://www.bis.org/fsb/publ/d14_1106.pdf
- https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-II/subchapter-A/part-252/subpart-I

## Citation

- APA: Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD. (2026). ISDA Section 5(a) Events of Default vs Section 5(b) Termination Events: Cross-Default & Threshold Amounts. FinLexicon Wiki. https://finlexicon.org/wiki/isda-section-5-events-of-default-cross-default-threshold-amount
- Canonical article: [ISDA Section 5(a) Events of Default vs Section 5(b) Termination Events: Cross-Default & Threshold Amounts](https://finlexicon.org/wiki/isda-section-5-events-of-default-cross-default-threshold-amount)
- Site research index: [FinLexicon Wiki](https://finlexicon.org/llms-full.txt)
