# CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG): EMIR 25% & Second-Tranche Rules

> Analyze CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG): EU EMIR RTS 153/2013 25% regulatory capital formula, EU CCPRRR Second-Tranche SITG (10%–25%), and G-SIB vs CCP debates.

Canonical: https://finlexicon.org/wiki/skin-in-the-game-sitg-emir-25-percent-capital-incentive-alignment
Last updated: 2026-11-14T19:32:17.422Z

**Publication:** FinLexicon Wiki
**Category:** Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall
**Published:** 2026-11-13T08:10:25.915Z
**Author:** Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD (CPA, JD in International Banking & Basel Regulation)
**Reviewer:** Not recorded

## Answer-first summary

For-profit publicly listed exchanges own today’s systemic clearing houses—creating moral hazard if CCP shareholders suffer tiny losses while clearing banks fund multi-billion-dollar Default Funds; examine EMIR’s 25% Skin-in-the-Game formula and EU CCPRRR’s Second-Tranche SITG.

## Key takeaways

- CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG) places CCP shareholder equity above surviving members’ Default Fund, penalizing for-profit exchange owners immediately if under-calibrated Initial Margin fails.
- Under EU/UK EMIR RTS 153/2013, First-Tranche SITG equals at least 25% of minimum regulatory capital (allocated pro-rata across each Default Fund silo).
- EU CCPRRR (2021/23) added a mandatory Second-Tranche SITG (10%–25% of risk-based capital) seated *after* the pre-funded Default Fund and *before* member recovery cash calls or VMGH.
- DTCC (FICC/NSCC) differs structurally from for-profit exchanges (CME, LSEG, ICE) because DTCC is user-owned and user-governed by its clearing bank and broker-dealer participants!

## Related financial entities

- **Basel III CET1 Capital Adequacy Standard** (BCBS-CET1) — license: International regulatory accord requiring Tier-1 common equity capital ratios, G-SIB surcharges, and liquidity buffers for banking institutions.
- **Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk (SA-CCR) Alpha Factor** (SA-CCR-EAD) — license: Standardized Approach for Counterparty Credit Risk (SA-CCR) Alpha Factor (SA-CCR-EAD) refers to an institutional financial benchmark and regulatory standard monitored by BIS BCBS CRE52 (INTL), currently calibrated at 1.4x (Supervisory Alpha Scalar) as of October 2026.

## Analysis

Thirty years ago, clearing houses were member-owned utilities; today, the world’s largest CCPs are owned by **for-profit, publicly traded exchange groups** (**LSEG**, **CME Group**, **Deutsche Börse**, **Intercontinental Exchange**). Look at the asymmetric governance tension pointed out repeatedly by [Bank of America](/institutions/bofa), [BNP Paribas](/institutions/bnp-paribas), and FIA/ISDA bank coalitions: **the CCP operator sets Initial Margin models, approves new exotic products, and collects clearing fees—while Clearing Members supply `97%–99%` of the mutualized Default Fund**! **CCP Skin-in-the-Game (`SITG`)** is the statutory equity tranche designed to align those incentives.

## How EU EMIR RTS `153/2013` Sizes First-Tranche Skin-in-the-Game (`25%` of Minimum Capital)

Under **EU EMIR Article 45(4)** and **Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013 (`Article 35`)**—retained in UK CCP rules by the [Bank of England](/institutions/bank-of-england) and mirrored globally—every CCP must dedicate a slice of its **own shareholder equity (`SITG`)** inside the [6-tranche CCP Default Waterfall](/wiki/ccp-default-waterfall-tranches-defaulter-pay-sitg-mutualization) seated **immediately ABOVE the defaulter’s own IM/DF and immediately BELOW surviving members’ Default Fund**, anchored in our [CCP Default Waterfalls & Central Clearing cornerstone guide](/wiki/ccp-default-waterfalls-pfmi-vmgh-clearing-novation-guide).

How is **EMIR Minimum Regulatory Capital** (`and thus the 25% SITG floor`) calculated under **EMIR RTS `152/2013`**?
1. **Winding-Down / Restructuring Expense**: Minimum **6 months (`50%`) of gross annual operational expenses**.
2. **Operational & Legal Risk Capital** (`Basic Indicator or AMA`).
3. **Credit, Counterparty & Market Risk Capital** on the CCP’s *own* treasury investment portfolio (`NOT cleared trades!`).
4. **Business Risk Capital** (`minimum 25% of annual gross operational expenses`).
- **First-Tranche SITG Formula**: `SITG_1 >= 25% * Capital_EMIR_Minimum`, allocated across compartmentalized Default Funds **proportional to each Default Fund’s size**!

## The G-SIB vs Exchange Debate: Why `25% of CCP Capital` Often Equals Only `1%–3%` of the Default Fund!

Spot the arithmetic catch highlighted by **ISDA, FIA, and 20 global clearing banks**: because a CCP’s operational capital (`e.g., $300M`) scales with *IT/staff overhead* rather than `$150 trillion` of cleared derivatives risk, **`25%` of `$300M` equals `$75 million` of SITG**—sitting directly in front of a **`$6,000 million` (`$6.0B`) member-funded Default Fund (`just 1.25% of the Default Fund!`)**!

- **What Clearing Banks Argue**: SITG should scale dynamically with **risk (`e.g., 5%–10% of the Cover-2 Default Fund`)** so an exchange cannot rush an illiquid product to market with `99%` survivor-funded protection.
- **What CCP Operators & [CPMI-IOSCO](/regulators/bcbs-bis) Counter**: CCPs are **risk-neutral market-infrastructure utilities (`collecting 0.1–0.5 bps clearing fees, NOT 15% ROE risk-taking banks!`)**; forcing a CCP to hold `$1.5B` of first-loss equity (`wiped out on 1 tail event`) would either triple client clearing fees or decapitalize the CCP corporation mid-crisis when markets need the CCP operating!

![Comparison of EMIR CCP Capital buildup and resulting 1st and 2nd SITG tranches ($M) vs a $4,000M Member Default Fund](/api/figure?type=bars&title=EMIR%20CCP%20Capital%20Build-Up%20vs%20%60%244%2C000M%60%20Member%20Default%20Fund%20%28%24M%29&subtitle=Illustrating%20how%20OpEx-driven%20CCP%20capital%20produces%20%24110M%20First%20SITG%20%2B%20%2477M%20Second%20SITG&steps=EMIR%20Min.%20Reg%20Capital%3A%3A%24440M%20%3D%20%24180M%206m%20Winding-Down%20%2B%20%24110M%20Op%2FLegal%20%2B%20%2460M%20Treasury%20Inv.%20%2B%20%2490M%20Biz%20Risk%7CFirst-Tranche%20SITG%20%2825%25%29%3A%3A%24110M%20%2825%25%20*%20%24440M%29%20sits%20ahead%20of%20the%20%244%2C000M%20Survivor%20DF%20%282.75%25%20of%20DF%20size%29%7CSecond-Tranche%20SITG%20%2817.5%25%29%3A%3A%2477M%20%28calibrated%20via%20ESMA%20RTS%20governance%2Finvestment%20scorecards%20between%2010%25%20and%2025%25%29%7CSurviving%20Capital%20Buffer%3A%3A%24253M%20intact%20winding-down%2Foperational%20equity%20so%20the%20CCP%20remains%20legally%20licensed%20post-loss!&metrics=Total%20EMIR%20Capital%3A%3A%24440M%3A%3APlus%2010%25%20Notification%20Buffer%7C1st%20Tranche%20SITG%3A%3A%24110M%20%2825%25%29%3A%3AShields%20Entry%20to%20%244B%20DF%7C2nd%20Tranche%20SITG%3A%3A%2477M%20%2817.5%25%29%3A%3AShields%20Entry%20to%20Cash%20Calls%7CProtected%20Core%20Cap%3A%3A%24253M%20Intact%3A%3AKeeps%20CCP%20License%20Alive!)

## The European Compromise: EU `CCPRRR (2021/23)` "Second-Tranche Skin-in-the-Game" (`SSITG`)

When the European Union enacted the **[CCP Recovery and Resolution Regulation (`CCPRRR`, Regulation (EU) 2021/23, Article 9(14))](/wiki/eu-ccprrr-ccp-recovery-resolution-regulation-cash-calls-ncwo)** supervised by ESMA and national authorities alongside the [ECB](/regulators/european-central-bank-160), lawmakers introduced a clever **two-layer SITG compromise**:

- **First-Tranche SITG (`25%` of risk-based capital)** stays **above** the Pre-Funded Default Fund (`protecting members from small tail breaches`).
- **NEW Second-Tranche SITG (`SSITG` — calibrated under ESMA RTS `2023/840` between `10%` and `25%` of risk-based capital!)** sits **AFTER the Pre-Funded Default Fund, right BEFORE or pari-passu with non-defaulting members’ Recovery Cash Calls / VMGH**—ensuring CCP management cannot trigger member cash calls or `VMGH` recovery tools pain-free!

![Placement of First-Tranche SITG (25% EMIR capital) and EU CCPRRR Second-Tranche SITG (10%-25% capital) inside the CCP Default Waterfall](/api/figure?type=flow&title=Dual-Layer%20CCP%20Skin-in-the-Game%20%28%60First%20SITG%60%20%2B%20%60Second%20SITG%60%29&subtitle=Guarding%20both%20entry%20into%20Mutualized%20Default%20Funds%20and%20entry%20into%20Recovery%20Cash%20Calls%2FVMGH&steps=1.%20Size%20EMIR%20Capital%3A%3ASum%20Winding-Down%20%286m%20OpEx%29%20%2B%20Op%2FLegal%20Risk%20%2B%20Treasury%20Investment%20Risk%20%2B%2025%25%20Biz%20Risk%7C2.%201st%20SITG%20%28%3E%3D25%25%29%3A%3APlace%20%3E%3D25%25%20of%20EMIR%20Capital%20BEFORE%20Survivors%E2%80%99%20Pre-Funded%20Default%20Fund%20%28allocated%20by%20DF%29%7C3.%20Burn%20Pre-Funded%20DF%3A%3AIf%20Cover-2%20default%20exceeds%201st%20SITG%2C%20exhaust%20Surviving%20Members%E2%80%99%20Pre-Funded%20Default%20Fund%7C4.%202nd%20SITG%20%2810%E2%80%9325%25%29%3A%3ABurn%20ESMA%20RTS%2010%25%E2%80%9325%25%20Second-Tranche%20SITG%20%2B%20Freeze%20Dividends%20BEFORE%20Recovery%20Cash%20Calls!&metrics=1st%20SITG%20Floor%3A%3A25%25%20EMIR%20Cap.%3A%3AEMIR%20Art.%2045%284%29%20%2F%20RTS%20Art.%2035%7C2nd%20SITG%20Band%3A%3A10%25%E2%80%9325%25%20Cap.%3A%3AEU%20CCPRRR%20Art.%209%2814%29%20ESMA%20RTS%7CSITG%20vs%20Total%20DF%3A%3A~1.5%25%20to%205%25%3A%3AUtility%20Fee%20vs%20Risk%20Debate%7CBonus%20%2F%20Div%20Ban%3A%3AMandatory%20Freeze%3A%3AUpon%20Recovery%20SITG%20Breach)

## U.S. CFTC & SEC Market Practice: Voluntary Corporate SITG Commitments (`$100M–$250M+`)

Although neither the CFTC nor the SEC codified a hard `25%` statutory formula like EMIR, competitive pressure from clearing banks led **CME Clearing (`$100M` IRS + `$100M` Base + `$50M` futures corporate contributions)**, **ICE Clear Credit (`$50M`)**, and **DTCC FICC (`25%` corporate allocation of retained earnings)** to hard-code explicit first-loss SITG tranches into their rulebooks across the [CCP Default Waterfalls & Central Clearing topic hub](/topics/central-clearing-ccp-waterfall).

| CCP / Regulatory Framework | First-Tranche SITG Rule (`Pre-Survivor DF`) | Second-Tranche SITG Rule (`Pre-Recovery Calls`) | Pro-Rata Silo Split Rule |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **EU CCPs (`Eurex, LCH SA` — EMIR + CCPRRR)** | **`>= 25%`** of EMIR Minimum Capital | **`10%–25%`** of Risk-Based Capital (`ESMA RTS 2023/840`) | Allocated strictly proportional to each Default Fund |
| **UK CCPs (`LCH Ltd, ICE Clear Europe`)** | **`>= 25%`** of UK EMIR Minimum Capital | BoE CCP Supervisory Recovery alignment | Ring-fenced per service (`SwapClear`, `ForexClear`, etc.) |
| **CME Clearing (`U.S. CFTC SIDCO`)** | Rulebook Dedicated Corporate Contribution (`$100M` Base, `$150M` IRS) | Governance & cooling-off protections | Dedicated dollar commitment per clearing silo |
| **DTCC FICC / NSCC (`U.S. SEC SIFMU`)** | **`>= 25%`** of retained net income Corporate Contribution (`Rule 4`) | Board replenishment discretion (`Member-owned utility!`) | Allocated across GSD, MBSD, and NSCC |

## SITG Replenishment Rules & Restriction on Executive Bonuses / Dividends

Whenever a default pierces First- or Second-Tranche SITG, CCP rulebooks require replenishing SITG within `20–30 business days` (`out of retained earnings/parent equity`, **never** billed to clearing members!) and trigger **automatic dividend and executive variable-bonus freezes** under EU CCPRRR!

```formula
Cap_EMIR_Min = 0.50 * Annual_Gross_OpEx + Cap_OpRisk + Cap_Treasury_InvestRisk + max( 0.25 * Annual_OpEx , BizRisk_Est )
SITG_First_Silo_d = ( 0.25 * Cap_EMIR_Min ) * [ DF_PreFunded_d / Sum_{m=1..D} DF_PreFunded_m ]
SITG_Second_CCPRRR = alpha_ESMA * ( Cap_OpRisk + Cap_Treasury_InvestRisk + Cap_BizRisk ) where alpha_ESMA in [ 0.10 , 0.25 ]
```

## Frequently asked questions

### Why would setting SITG at 100% of a CCP’s equity actually be dangerous for financial stability?

If a Cover-2 default wiped out 100% of a CCP’s regulatory capital, the CCP itself would immediately breach its statutory 6-month winding-down capital license floor—forcing regulators to shut down or resolve the clearing house right in the middle of a financial crisis! Keeping ~55%–65% of core operational capital un-pledged keeps the CCP operating seamlessly.

### How does ESMA RTS 2023/840 decide whether an EU CCP’s Second-Tranche SITG is 10% or 25%?

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/840 scores four objective indicators (each worth up to 3.75% above the 10% base): (1) structure/cross-default complexity, (2) absence of member governance committee vetoes, (3) non-cash/risky treasury investment profile, and (4) frequency of margin backtesting breaches (pushing riskier CCPs toward the full 25% cap)!

### Does higher CCP Skin-in-the-Game lower a bank’s Basel CRE54 Default Fund Capital Charge?

Yes, directly! In Basel CRE54, the QCCP’s dedicated SITG (DF_CCP) is subtracted from K_CCP (or increases total pre-funded resources DF_pref), directly lowering surviving banks’ regulatory capital requirement on their Default Fund contributions!

### Can a CCP invest its Skin-in-the-Game equity in corporate equities or high-yield bonds to boost ROE?

Strictly NO! Under EMIR RTS 153/2013 Articles 45 & 47, a CCP’s regulatory capital (including SITG) must be invested exclusively in central-bank cash or ultra-liquid, minimal-credit-risk sovereign bonds (HQLA) capable of immediate same-day liquidation during a default!


## Source URLs

- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0153
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32023R0840
- https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf

## Citation

- APA: Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD. (2026). CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG): EMIR 25% Minimum Capital Rule, Second-Tranche SITG & Incentive Alignment. FinLexicon Wiki. https://finlexicon.org/wiki/skin-in-the-game-sitg-emir-25-percent-capital-incentive-alignment
- Canonical article: [CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG): EMIR 25% Minimum Capital Rule, Second-Tranche SITG & Incentive Alignment](https://finlexicon.org/wiki/skin-in-the-game-sitg-emir-25-percent-capital-incentive-alignment)
- Site research index: [FinLexicon Wiki](https://finlexicon.org/llms-full.txt)
