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Artículos y registros de fuentes

Consulta artículos y registros de fuentes sobre entidades. Los artículos están en inglés; comprueba las fuentes originales directamente.

Artículos y registros de fuentes

ES · FIN-LEXICON

Artículos y registros de fuentes

Consulta artículos y registros de fuentes sobre entidades. Los artículos están en inglés; comprueba las fuentes originales directamente.

Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Default Waterfalls, CPMI-IOSCO PFMI, VMGH, LSOC Segregation & Treasury Central Clearing Guide

Post-2008 G20 clearing mandates and SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) concentrated trillions of interest-rate swaps and U.S. Treasury repos inside systemic Central Counterparties (CCPs)—governed by CPMI-IOSCO PFMI Cover-2 default waterfalls, Skin-in-the-Game, LSOC segregation, and VMGH recovery tools.

Conclusión clave: Central clearing replaces tangled bilateral OTC credit webs with multilateral netting, daily STM MTM settlement, 99%+ Initial Margin, and a 2% Basel CRE54 QCCP risk weight.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

Clearing Novation vs Open-Offer Mechanics, Multilateral Netting & TriOptima Portfolio Compression

Central clearing relies on two distinct legal mechanisms—Novation of bilateral trades vs Open-Offer instantaneous CCP contract creation—paired with multilateral netting and linear-programming portfolio compression that shrinks G-SIB leverage denominators by hundreds of trillions.

Conclusión clave: Novation extinguishes a momentary bilateral contract and replaces it with two CCP contracts (within <=10 seconds under CFTC STP rules), whereas Open Offer creates Member <-> CCP contracts instantaneously at match.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CPMI-IOSCO PFMI Principles 4 & 7: Cover-2 Credit Default Fund vs Cover-1 / Cover-2 Liquidity Sizing

Solvency ("Credit Cover-2") and same-day cash settlement ("Liquidity Cover-1 / Cover-2") are completely distinct CCP survival constraints under CPMI-IOSCO PFMI Principles 4 and 7—especially when a defaulting G-SIB simultaneously acts as a CCP’s custodian, repo provider, and FX swap line!

Conclusión clave: PFMI Principle 4 (Credit) sizes solvency loss absorption (Cover-2 across all EU CCPs, UK systemic CCPs, and U.S. SIDCOs), whereas Principle 7 (Liquidity) sizes same-day cash payment capacity.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Default Waterfall Tranches: Defaulter-Pay IM/DF, Skin-in-the-Game & Survivor Mutualization

Every systemic clearing house encodes a strict statutory waterfall balancing "Defaulter-Pay" collateral against "Survivor-Pay" mutualization—making tranche thickness, siloed asset-class firewalls (IRS vs FX vs CDS), and auction juniorization critical for G-SIB risk managers.

Conclusión clave: A compliant CCP Default Waterfall enforces strict priority: Defaulter IM -> Defaulter DF -> CCP First-Loss SITG -> Juniorized Survivor DF -> 2nd SITG / Capped Assessments -> VMGH.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG): EMIR 25% Minimum Capital Rule, Second-Tranche SITG & Incentive Alignment

For-profit publicly listed exchanges own today’s systemic clearing houses—creating moral hazard if CCP shareholders suffer tiny losses while clearing banks fund multi-billion-dollar Default Funds; examine EMIR’s 25% Skin-in-the-Game formula and EU CCPRRR’s Second-Tranche SITG.

Conclusión clave: CCP Skin-in-the-Game (SITG) places CCP shareholder equity above surviving members’ Default Fund, penalizing for-profit exchange owners immediately if under-calibrated Initial Margin fails.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

Variation Margin Gains Haircutting (VMGH), Partial Tear-Up & End-of-Waterfall CCP Recovery Tools

When a catastrophic Cover-3+ shock exhausts 100% of a CCP’s Default Fund and capped assessments, CCP recovery rulebooks deploy Variation Margin Gains Haircutting (VMGH) and Partial Tear-Up while strictly prohibiting Initial Margin Haircutting.

Conclusión clave: Variation Margin Gains Haircutting (VMGH) collects 100% of cash owed by OTM losers and applies a pro-rata haircut only to cumulative net ITM gainers—keeping the CCP cash-balanced without bankruptcy.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

Client Clearing Segregation: US CFTC Part 22 LSOC vs EU EMIR Article 39 Omnibus (OSA) & Individual (ISA)

When MF Global (2011) and Refco (2005) collapsed, buy-side treasurers discovered not all "segregated" clearing accounts protect against Fellow-Customer Risk; compare U.S. CFTC Part 22 LSOC cleared-swap segregation against U.S. Futures Net/Gross Omnibus and EU EMIR Article 39 OSA/ISA.

Conclusión clave: U.S. CFTC Part 22 LSOC (Cleared Swaps) combines one low-cost operationally commingled pool with per-client legal CCP ledgers, eliminating 100% of Fellow-Customer trading loss risk (17 CFR § 22.15).

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) U.S. Treasury Cash & Repo Central Clearing Mandate: Scope, Deadlines & FICC Impact

Following March 2020 "Dash-for-Cash" and September 2019 repo market dislocations, SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) brings trillions in bilateral inter-dealer cash Treasuries and hedge-fund/money-fund Treasury repos into central clearing at DTCC FICC.

Conclusión clave: SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(18) mandates central clearing via FICC’s Direct Participant rulebook—closing the inter-dealer IDB/PTF "hybrid clearing" cash gap and sweeping hedge-fund & MMF Treasury repos into central clearing.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

FICC Sponsored Member Repo: Done-With vs Done-Away Execution, ASC 210-20 Netting & SLR Relief

Quarter-end U.S. repo rate spikes occur whenever G-SIB dealers run out of Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) balance-sheet space; FICC Sponsored Member Repo unlocks US GAAP ASC 210-20-45-11 netting while splitting Wall Street over "Done-With" vs "Done-Away" execution.

Conclusión clave: Sponsoring opposing buy-side repo and reverse-repo legs into DTCC FICC satisfies US GAAP ASC 210-20-45-11 (same counterparty = FICC + same explicit maturity date), collapsing dealer SLR assets up to 98%.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

SEC Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3a Note H: Broker-Dealer Customer U.S. Treasury Margin On-Posting to FICC

Historically, SEC Rule 15c3-3 ("Customer Protection Rule") banned U.S. broker-dealers from posting customer margin onward to FICC—forcing dealers to fund FICC margin out of house cash! Discover how the SEC’s Note H amendment to Rule 15c3-3a unlocked segregated customer Treasury clearing.

Conclusión clave: Before March 31, 2025, SEC Rule 15c3-3a lacked a debit line for DTCC FICC, forcing U.S. broker-dealers to lock customer margin in a Reserve Bank Account *and* fund FICC margin a second time out of house cash.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

FICC Capped Contingency Liquidity Facility (CCLF): Cover-1 Repo Liquidity Sizing & Bank LCR Impact

Because DTCC FICC lacks routine unlimited Federal Reserve Discount Window repo borrowing, FICC GSD Rule 22A Section 2a obligates every Netting Member to stand ready as a mandatory overnight repo buyer under the $100B+ Capped Contingency Liquidity Facility (CCLF).

Conclusión clave: FICC’s Capped Contingency Liquidity Facility (CCLF, GSD Rule 22A) is a mandatory, rules-based committed repo line (NOT a credit loss write-off) enabling FICC to meet PFMI Principle 7 Cover-1 liquidity without a banking license.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Margin Anti-Procyclicality (APC): EMIR RTS Article 28 25% Buffer, 10-Year Stress Weight & Margin Floors

When calm volatility explodes in a crisis (March 2020 COVID or 2022 natural gas), short-lookback VaR models double CCP Initial Margin overnight; explore EMIR Article 28’s three Anti-Procyclicality (APC) tools and EMIR 3.0 margin simulators.

Conclusión clave: EU/UK EMIR RTS 153/2013 Article 28 mandates at least one quantitative Anti-Procyclicality (APC) tool: a 25% exhaustible buffer (28a), a >=25% stressed-period weight (28b), or a 10-year unweighted volatility floor (28c).

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Default Management Groups (DMG), Macro Hedging, Auction Juniorization & 2018 Nasdaq Lessons

When a G-SIB clearing member defaults at 7:00 AM with 250,000 open swap tickets, dumping raw line items would spark fire sales; step inside the CCP Default Management Group (DMG) war room to see macro hedging, 2-way auctions, and DF juniorization.

Conclusión clave: A CCP Default Management Group (DMG) quarantines seconded dealer traders behind strict statutory NDAs to macro-hedge 80%–90% of directional DV01 *before* launching sub-portfolio auctions.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

Basel III CRE54 Qualifying CCP (QCCP) Capital: 2% vs 4% Client Trade Exposure Risk Weights & K_CCP

Central clearing earns massive bank capital relief ONLY when the clearing house qualifies as a "QCCP" under Basel III chapter CRE54—unlocking a 2% trade exposure risk weight, 0% bankruptcy-remote IM risk weight, and the SA-CCR-powered K_CCP Default Fund capital formula.

Conclusión clave: Under Basel CRE54, clearing at a Qualifying CCP (QCCP) earns a 2% trade exposure risk weight, 0% risk weight on bankruptcy-remote Initial Margin, 0% MAR50 CVA RWA, and 0% RWA on unfunded assessments.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Intraday Variation & Ad-Hoc Margin Calls: Dash-for-Cash Liquidity Spirals & One-Way Pass-Through

During March 2020 and the September 2022 UK Gilt LDI crisis, Central Counterparties issued billions in unscheduled 60-minute intraday cash calls—collecting cash immediately from losing dealers while holding back gains until tomorrow morning and creating an acute systemic cash sink!

Conclusión clave: Scheduled Two-Way Intraday VM (e.g., CME / FICC midday cycles) recycles cash from losers to winners the same afternoon ($0 net system drain), whereas One-Way Ad-Hoc Intraday Calls trap cash inside CCPs overnight.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

Cross-Margining Across Futures & Cleared Fixed Income: CME-FICC Treasury Offsets & Dual BD/FCMs

Clearing cash U.S. Treasury repos at DTCC FICC while clearing hedging Treasury futures at CME splits an economically flat basis trade across two separate CCPs—doubling Initial Margin unless united under the expanded CME-FICC Cross-Margining Agreement!

Conclusión clave: Splitting cash/repo U.S. Treasuries (DTCC FICC) from Treasury/SOFR futures (CME) across two regulators (SEC vs CFTC) would double Initial Margin on hedged duration books without Cross-Margining.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CLS Payment-versus-Payment (PvP) FX Settlement: Eliminating Herstatt Risk & 99% Pay-In Netting

Every day, over $6.5 trillion of wholesale FX settles across CLS Bank International’s 18-currency Payment-versus-Payment (PvP) grid—eliminating 1974 Herstatt principal loss while compressing gross cash funding requirements by 99% into a 5-hour Central European Time liquidity window!

Conclusión clave: CLS Bank International is a 18-currency Payment-versus-Payment (PvP) settlement system (NOT a CCP) that eliminates 100% of Herstatt FX principal risk while settling $6.5T+ daily.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Assessment Powers & Cooling-Off Periods: Capped Cash Calls vs Uncapped Refills & Bank Capital

Why would an "uncapped" CCP Default Fund assessment obligation render a clearing house unbankable for every G-SIB on Earth? Examine CCP Cooling-Off Periods, 1x–3x multi-default cash-call caps, resignation drop-dead windows, and Basel CRE54 / U.S. National Bank Act limits.

Conclusión clave: Under U.S. OCC national banking law (12 U.S.C. § 24) and Basel III, commercial banks cannot grant uncapped mutualized guarantees—forcing all global QCCPs to cap unfunded Default Fund assessments.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

EU CCP Recovery & Resolution Regulation (CCPRRR 2021/23) vs US Dodd-Frank Title II/VIII: NCWO & Bail-In

What if a systemic clearing house fails NOT from a member default, but from a $2B cyberattack, custodian bank failure, or treasury investment loss ("Non-Default Loss — NDL")? Compare EU CCPRRR (2021/23), UK BoE FMI Resolution, and U.S. Dodd-Frank Title II/VIII!

Conclusión clave: CCP crisis law draws an iron wall between Default Losses (DL) (mutualized across Default Funds) and Operational / Cyber Non-Default Losses (NDLs) (absorbed 100% by insurance, CCP equity write-down, and parent debt bail-in).

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD
Central Clearing Ccp Waterfall

CCP Initial Margin Models (Expected Shortfall vs SPAN 2): 5-Day House vs 7-Day Client MPOR & Porting

Why does clearing the exact same $500M 10-year SOFR swap as a Buy-Side Client require +18% higher Initial Margin than a Dealer House Account at LCH and Eurex—and why did CME retire 35-year-old legacy SPAN in favor of VaR-based SPAN 2?

Conclusión clave: OTC CCPs charge 7-business-day MPOR on Client accounts vs 5-business-day MPOR on Dealer House accounts (+18.3% higher client IM via sqrt(7/5)) to cover the mandatory 48-hour client porting window before close-out.

Arthur Pendleton, CPA, JD

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Registros de instituciones

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